We analyze the history of the equity risk premium from surveys of U.S. Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) conducted every quarter from June 2000 to June 2010. The risk premium is the expected 10-year S&P 500 return relative to a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yield. While the risk premium sharply increased during the financial crisis peaking in February 2009, the current surveys show that the premium has returned to levels observed in late 2006 and early 2007. The survey also provides measures of cross-sectional disagreement about the risk premium, skewness, and a measure of individual uncertainty. While disagreement has decreased from peak levels, the level of disagreement is still historically high suggesting considerable uncertainty. We also present evidence on the determinants of the long-run risk premium. Our analysis suggests the level of the risk premium closely tracks both market volatility (reflected in the VIX index) as well as credit spreads.
Introduction
We analyze the results of the most recent survey of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) conducted by Duke University and CFO Magazine. The survey closed on June 4, 2010 and measures expectations beginning in the third quarter of 2010. In particular, we poll CFOs about their longterm expected return on the S&P 500. Given the current 10-year T-bond yield, we provide estimates of the equity risk premium and show how the premium changes through time. We also provide information on the disagreement over the risk premium as well as average confidence intervals.
Method

Design
The quarterly survey of CFOs was initiated in the third quarter of 1996.
1 Every quarter, Duke
University polls financial officers with a short survey on important topical issues (Graham and Harvey, 2009 ). The usual response rate for the quarterly survey is 5%-8%. Starting in June of 2000, a question on expected stock market returns was added to the survey. Fig. 1 summarizes the results from the risk premium question. While the survey asks for both the one-year and ten-year expected returns, we focus on the ten-year expected returns herein, as a proxy for the market risk premium.
The executives have the job title of CFO, Chief Accounting Officer, Treasurer, Assistant
Treasurer, Controller, Assistant Controller, or Vice President (VP), Senior VP or Executive VP of Finance. Given that the overwhelming majority of survey respondents hold the CFO title, for simplicity we refer to the entire group as CFOs.
Delivery and response
In the early years of the survey, the surveys were faxed to executives. to fill out the survey, and then a reminder is sent allowing another four days. Usually, two-thirds of the surveys are returned within two business days.
The response rate of 5-8% could potentially lead to a non-response bias. There are five reasons why we are not overly concerned with the response rate. First, our response rate is within the range that is documented in many other survey studies. Second, Graham and Harvey (2001) 
Data integrity
In each quarter, we trim the top two and bottom two risk premium observations. Given that we have, on average, 333 responses each quarter, this implies a less than 1% trim in each of the tails. In addition, of the over 11,000 survey observations, there was only a single observation (in the June 2000 survey) that we consider not credible. The trimmed and untrimmed data are very similar with the exception of the June 2000 survey.
There are two other steps that we take. First, for the purpose of some of our statistics, we require that the expected risk premium forecast be no more than the best-case scenario and no less than the worst-case scenario. If the ordering is violated, then the observation is deleted. Second, there are a few instances in which respondents report in decimals rather than percentages. In these cases, we change the inputs to adhere to the survey format rather than deleting the observations.
The 2010 results
The expected market return questions are a subset of a larger set of questions in the quarterly survey of CFOs. The survey usually contains between eight and ten questions. Some of the questions are repeated every quarter and some change through time depending on economic conditions. The historical surveys can be accessed at http://www.cfosurvey.org. Appendix 1 shows the risk premium question in the most recent survey.
While the survey is anonymous, we collect demographic information on seven firm characteristics, including industry, sales revenue, number of employees, headquarters location, ownership (public or private), and proportion of foreign sales.
During the past ten years, we have collected 13,668 responses to the survey. Panel A of Table 1 presents the date that the survey window opened, the number of responses for each survey, the 10-year Treasury bond rate, as well as the average and median expected excess returns. There is relatively little time variation in the risk premium. This is confirmed in Fig. 1 We also report information on the average of the CFOs' assessments of the one in ten chance that the market will exceed or fall below a certain level. In the most recent survey, the worst case total return is 0.36% which is the second lowest observation (the lowest being the February 2010 survey). The best-case return is 10.58%.
With information on the 10% tails, we construct a probability distribution for each respondent.
We use Davidson and Cooper's (1976) method to recover each respondent's probability distribution:
where x(0.90) and x(0.10) represent the 90 th and 10 th percentiles of the respondent's distribution. Keefer and Bodily (1983) show that this simple approximation is the preferred method of estimating the variance of a probability distribution of random variables, given information about the 10 th and 90 th percentiles. Like disagreement, the average of individual volatilities peaked in February 2009.
The current level, 3.86%, is elevated and higher than the average during 2009. This reinforces the considerable uncertainty about economic prospects.
There is also a natural measure of asymmetry in each respondent's response. We look at the difference between each individual's 90% tail and the mean forecast and the mean minus the 10% tail. Hence, if the respondent's forecast of the excess return is 6% and the tails are -8% and +11%, then the distribution is negatively skewed with a value of -9% (=5%-14%). As with the usual measure of skewness, we cube this quantity and standardize by dividing by the cube of the individual standard deviation. In every quarter's survey, there is on average negative skewness in the individual forecasts. The average asymmetry became more negative at -0.63 which is the second lowest ever recorded (lowest is February 2010).
Overall, the survey points to: (a) reduction in the risk premium from peak levels, (b) record low total market returns, and (c) near record levels of uncertainty.
between 4 and 6%. Also see Siegel (1999) , Asness (2000) , Heaton and Lucas (2000) and Jagannathan, McGratten and Scherbina (2001) . 
Interviews
To further explore the risk premium, we conduct brief interviews on the topic of the cost of capital and the risk premium to understand the question that CFOs believe they are answering. We conducted 12 interviews over the 2003-2005 period. 4 We gain a number of insights from the interviews. There is remarkable consistency in the CFOs' views.
First, the CFOs closely track both their company's stock and the market. They are often called upon internally (e.g., Board of Directors) or externally (analyst conference calls) to explain their company's stock price. As a result, they need to try to separate out the systematic and idiosyncratic variation in their company's stock returns. To do this, they attempt to understand the forces that might cause systematic variation in the market.
Second, the CFOs believe that the "risk premium" is a longer-term measure of expected excess returns and best covered by our question on the expected excess return over the next ten yearsrather than the one-year question. Three-fourths of the interviewees use a form of the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (which is consistent with the evidence in Graham and Harvey, 2001 ). They use a measure of the risk premium in their implementation of the CAPM. Often their 10-year risk premium is supplemented so that that company's hurdle rate exceeds their expected excess return on the S&P 500. Also, while not specified in the question, CFOs interpret the 10-year expected market return as the return to a buy-and-hold strategy. As a result, our survey measures the geometric rather than arithmetic average return. 10-year forecasted S&P 500 returns over and above the 10-year Treasury bond yield
Explaining variation in the risk premium
While we document the level and a limited time-series of the long-run risk premium, statistical inference is complicated by the fact that the forecasting horizons are overlapping. First, we have no way of measuring the accuracy of the risk premiums as forecasts of equity returns. Second, any inference based on regression analysis is confounded by the fact that from one quarter to the next, there are 38 common quarters being forecasted. This naturally induces a moving-average process.
We do, however, try to characterize the time-variation in the risk premium without formal statistical tests. Figure 2 examines the relation between the mean premium and previous one-year returns on the S&P 500. The evidence suggests that there is a weak negative correlation between past returns and the level of the long-run risk premium. This makes economic sense. When prices are low (after negative returns), expected return increase.
An alternative to using past-returns is to examine a measure of valuation. Figure 3 examines a scatter of the mean premium versus the price-to-earnings ratio of the S&P 500. The equity risk premium and the S&P 500 price-to-earnings ratio: full sample Looking at the data in Figure 3a , it appears that the inference is complicated by a non-linear relation.
At very high levels of valuation, the expected return (the risk premium) was low. Figures 3b and 3c show the relation split by a PE level of 25. In all three graphs, three observations are excluded with PE ratio of 85, 123 and 130. The equity risk premium and the S&P 500 price-to-earnings ratio when PE<25 The equity risk premium and the S&P 500 price-to-earnings ratio when PE>25 The non-linear relation is not a quirk of the PE ratio that we use. Figure 3d uses the forward and actual P/E ratios that S&P constructs from bottom up data. There are no observations excluded in this graph.
Figure 3d
The equity risk premium and the S&P 500 forward and actual price-to-earnings ratio: full sample We also examine the real yield on Treasury Inflation Indexed Notes. The risk premium is like an expected real return on the equity market. It seems reasonable that there could be a correlation between expected real rates of return stocks and bonds. Figure 4 examines the 10-year on the run yield on the Treasury Inflation Indexed Notes. In this case, there is a weak positive correlation. Lower TIPS yields are associated with lower equity risk premiums. However, the analysis is only suggestive that the long-run equity premium and real interest rates move together.
Finally, we consider two measures of risk and the risk premium. Figure 5 shows that over our sample there is evidence of a strong positive correlation between market volatility and the long-term risk premium. We use a five-day moving average of the implied volatility on the S&P index option (VIX) as our volatility proxy. The correlation between the risk premium and volatility is 0.60. If the closing day of the survey is used, the correlation is roughly the same. Asset pricing theory suggests that there is a positive relation between risk and expected return. While our volatility proxy doesn't match the horizon of the risk premium, the evidence, nevertheless, is suggestive of a positive relation. The equity risk premium and the implied volatility on the S&P 500 index option (VIX) Correlation=0.60 VI
10-year premium
We also consider an alternative risk measure, the credit spread. We look at the correlation between Moody's Baa rated bond yields less the 10-year Treasury bond yield and the risk premium. Figure 6 shows a highly significant relation between the time-series with a correlation of 0.54. The equity risk premium and credit spreads 
Risk premium data and corporate policies
New research by Ben-David, uses the one-year risk premium forecasts as a measure of optimism and the 80% confidence intervals as a direct measure of overconfidence.
By linking email addresses that respondents provide to archival corporate data, Ben-David et al. find that the tightness of the confidence intervals is correlated with corporate investment. Overconfident managers invest more. premiums to examine the implications of financial constraints on the real activities of the firm. They provide new evidence on the negative impact of financial constraints on firms' investment plans.
Campello, Giambona, use the survey during to study how firms managed liquidity during the financial crisis.
Graham, Harvey and Puri (2010a) administer a psychometric test using the survey instrument and link CEO optimism and risk aversion to corporate financial policies. Graham, Harvey and Puri (2010b) use survey data to study how capital is allocated within the firm and the degree to which CEOs delegate decision making to CFOs. 
CFO Survey compared to other surveys
Conclusions
We provide a direct measure of ten-year market returns based on a multi-year survey of Chief Financial Officers. Importantly, we have a 'measure' of expectations. We do not claim it is the true market expectation. Nevertheless, the CFO measure has not been studied before.
While there is relatively little time-variation in the risk premium, a number of patterns emerge. We offer evidence that the risk premium is higher during recessions and non-recessions. Given the recent global economic crisis, the risk premium has hit a record high for our ten years of surveys.
We also present evidence on disagreement. With higher disagreement, people often have less confidence in their forecasts. While the risk premium has decreased since the peak during the crisis, our measures of disagreement are still elevated suggesting considerable uncertainty persists.
While we have 13,668 survey responses over 10 years, much of our analysis uses summary statistics for each survey. As such, with only 41 unique quarters of predictions and a variable of interest that has a 10-year horizon, it is impossible to evaluate the accuracy of the market excess return forecasts. Indeed, the June 6, 2000 10-year annual forecast was 10.45% and the realized annual S&P 500 return through June 4, 2010 is -3.09%. There is some weak correlation between past returns, real interest rates and the of risk premium. In contrast, there is significant evidence on the relation between two common measures of economic risk and the risk premium. We find that both the implied volatility on the S&P index as well as a commonly used measure of credit spreads are highly correlated with our measured equity risk premium.
